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 Abstract 
 
 
 
The role of owner-provided services in fee-based recreation access is evaluated for the case of 
waterfowl hunting.   An hedonic framework is used to analyze and estimate the implicit price of 
some waterfowl hunting lease attributes.  A mail survey of Louisiana waterfowl hunters 
provides primary data for estimation of the hedonic price model specified in semi-log functional 
form. The willingness-to-pay functions for increased acreage per hunting club member, 
increased lease time, and travel distance are also empirically estimated, providing information 
on the implicit demand for these lease characteristics. 
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1.Introduction 
 
Demographic and social profiles of recreationists suggest a tendency toward specialization 
associated with increased income, age, and experience (Heywood, 1987; Schreyer, et al., 1984).  
These factors together reflect an investment in human capital (development of recreation related 
skills) as well as an investment in other forms of recreation capital, including specialized 
equipment or improved access to the recreation site through land purchases or leasing.  Many 
specialized outdoor recreationists, including waterfowl hunters, rely on fee-based access to 
recreation sites which may be specialized and relatively fixed in supply.  
 
In many states, landowners interested in participating in this market for fee-based recreation 
access to waterfowl hunting lack information regarding the owner-provided services demanded 
by waterfowl hunters (Allen, et al., 1985).  For example, access may be through a commercial 
day hunt operation with minimal provision of services, a commercial lodge offering short term, 
hotel-like accommodation, or provision of seasonally leased acreage with optional owner 
provided services. In the case of landowners seeking to maximize rents by providing land for 
waterfowl hunting leases, owner-provided services can include land preparation and flooding, 
construction of blinds or pits, improved access (boat launch or road improvement), or provision 
of liability insurance.  However, without information describing the demand for these lease 
attributes, landowners may over provide or under provide services, provide improperly tailored 
services, or provide the wrong services as part of the lease price.  
 
This research draws on economic characteristic theory and the hedonic price method to 
empirically evaluate the attributes of fee-based recreation access to migratory waterfowl 
(Lancaster, 1966; Freeman, 1979).  Primary data is used in an hedonic price framework to 
empirically identify the characteristics of waterfowl hunting leases in Louisiana which 
significantly contribute to the value of a lease.  The term "lease", as used in this study, refers to 
the land to which hunting access rights are obtained, not the legal agreement granting access 
rights.  The next section of the paper presents an overview of the hedonic price method with 
selected applications, followed by data collection procedures and data description.  Estimation of 
the hedonic price function and the implicit prices of selected lease attributes follow.  The paper 
concludes with a summary and discussion of the empirical 
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 results, emphasizing managerial applications for landowners interested in waterfowl leases. 
 
2. Hedonic Price Theory:  Applications 
 
Characteristic theory and the hedonic price method of analysis assume that a commodity such as 
leased hunting land can be viewed as an aggregation of individual components or attributes 
(Griliches, 1971).  Consumers are assumed to behave in such a way that they purchase goods 
embodying bundles of attributes that maximize their underlying utility functions. Rosen (1984) 
describes the process in which prices reveal quality variations as relying on producers who 
"tailor their goods to embody final characteristics described by customers and receive returns for 
serving economic functions as mediaries".  The hedonic price method originates from 
Lancaster's (1966) proposal that goods are inputs in the activity of consumption, with an end 
product of a set of characteristics.  Bundles of characteristics rather than bundles of goods are 
ranked according to their utility bearing abilities.  Attributes are implicitly embodied in goods 
and their observed market prices.    The amount or presence of attributes associated with the 
commodities defines a set of implicit or "hedonic" prices (Rosen, 1984).  The marginal implicit 
values of the attributes are obtained by differentiating the hedonic price function with respect to 
each attribute (Freeman, 1979; McMillan et al., 1980).  
 
The hedonic price method has been applied to wildlife related recreation resources (Pope and 
Stoll, 1985; Livengood, 1983; Pope et al., 1984; and Messonnier and Luzar, 1990), agricultural 
commodities (Brorsen et al., 1894; Ethridge and Davis, 1982; Wilson, 1984), and residential 
amenities (Blomquist and Worley, 1981; McMillan et al., 1980; Witte et al., 1979; and Milon et 
al., 1984,).  Other applications have involved the estimation of the benefits of environmental 
improvements (Freeman, 1979; Blomquist and Worley, 1981; Harrison and Rubinfeld, 1978; 
and McMillan et al., 1980), which include the complete, two-stage hedonic analysis.  The first 
stage involves estimating the implicit price function for a good's attributes.  The inverse demand 
function for a characteristic of interest is estimated in a second stage by regressing individual 
household marginal willingness-to-pay on the level of the characteristic and other household 
characteristics hypothesized to affect demand. 
 
This analysis used the hedonic price method to empirically evaluate the contribution of owner-
provided services to the value of a waterfowl hunting lease in Louisiana. Owner-provided 
services as well as other characteristics of waterfowl leases were hypothesized to 
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 influence the price paid for the lease.  Within the hedonic framework, this analysis involved 
regressing observed market prices paid for waterfowl hunting leases against those characteristics 
of a lease hypothesized to be determinants of the price paid.  Attributes chosen for this analysis 
characterize waterfowl leases in terms of habitat, distance, length of lease, and by services 
provided by the landowner. Attributes hypothesized to contribute to the value of a waterfowl 
hunting lease included lease acreage per member, number of years leased, distance from the 
hunter's home to the lease, binary variables representing the habitat type, (coastal marsh, 
bottomland hardwood, or cropland) and binary variables indicating landowner provision of 
services such as land preparation and flooding, construction of blinds or pits, access 
improvement (roads, boat launch), or liability insurance.   
 
 
Implicitly, the model for the hedonic price function was specified as: 
 
 
[1] PRICE = f   (IMPROVE, BLINDS, LANDPREP, HABITAT,  
       NONCON, ACPERMEM, DISTANCE, 
       LEASEYR, ε) 
 
 Variables in the model were defined as: 
 
 PRICE  = Price paid per club member for access rights 
 
 ACPERMEM (+) = Acres of lease per club member 
 
 DISTANCE (+) = Distance of lease from respondent's home (in miles) 
 
 IMPROVE (+) = Dummy for landowner provided access 
     improvements;  1 if provided, 0 otherwise 
 
 BLINDS (+)  = Dummy for landowner provided hunting blinds or 
     pits;  1 if provided, 0 otherwise 
 
 LANDPREP (+) = Dummy for landowner provided land preparation or 
      
     flooding; 1 if provided, 0 otherwise 
 
 NONCON (+) = Dummy for availability of nonconsumptive lease uses  
    (eg. wildlife viewing);  1 if available, 0 otherwise 
 
 LEASEYR (+) = Years the land has been leased for waterfowl hunting 
 
 HABITAT (+) = Dummy for waterfowl lease habitat; 1 if coastal 
     marsh, 0 otherwise     
 
 ε   =  Error term 
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A priori hypotheses are indicated by (+) and (-) in the above specification.  Greater acreage per 
hunter on a lease was hypothesized to allow club members to reduce the congestion they might 
face on smaller leases or leases with high membership relative to the leased land area.  
Availability of alternative, nonconsumptive uses of the hunting lease spreads the use of the lease 
beyond the very limited waterfowl hunting season.  It was therefore hypothesized that as acreage 
per hunter increased and the availability of other nonconsumptive uses was exhibited, lease price 
per member would increase.  Due to travel costs, it is traditionally hypothesized that as distance 
from the hunter's home to the lease increased, lease price should decrease.  However, in the very 
specialized case of waterfowl hunting, it was hypothesized that hunters would pay a premium 
for remote waterfowl bearing habitat, suggesting a positive relationship between price per 
member and distance.  Although migratory waterfowl can be found in a variety of habitats, 
including bottomland hardwood forests, coastal marshes, inland wetlands, and agricultural 
cropland, some habitats offer superior access.  Habitat type, in this specification, coastal marsh, 
was hypothesized to positively influence price paid per member for waterfowl leases.  
Landowner provision of amenities and services was hypothesized to increase the value of a 
lease.  Therefore, coefficients of variables representing landowner provided land preparations, 
construction of blinds or pits, or access improvements (boat launch or roads) were expected to 
exhibit positive signs. Although landowner provided services were hypothesized to positively 
contribute to the value of a waterfowl lease, an alternative hypothesis suggests that specialized 
waterfowl hunters would prefer to lease acreage without landowner provided improvements and 
through time, add their own preferred lease attributes. The number of years that land had been 
leased for waterfowl hunting was therefore hypothesized to be positively associated with the 
value of a waterfowl lease. In this case, owner provided services might be viewed as 
inconsequential or intrusive by long term lease members.    
 
3. Data Collection Procedures 
 
Data for empirical estimation of the economic model were collected through a mail survey of 
7,022 of the 65,000 individuals who purchased duck stamps sold by the Louisiana Department 
of Wildlife and Fisheries for the 1990-1991 waterfowl hunting season. The final response rate 
for the survey which was conducted using the Dillman Total Design Method (Dillman, 1978) 
was 47 percent, or 3,319 usable responses. Data for this analysis come from a subsample of this 
data comprised of the 840 waterfowl hunters who indicated they leased 
5 
 
 land in Louisiana for waterfowl hunting during the 1990-1991 waterfowl hunting season.    
 
The mail survey elicited information from stamp duck purchasers regarding physical and 
biological characteristics of the leased land, services and facilities associated with the lease, 
hunting activities, and socio-economic attributes of the respondents.  Data requirements of the 
hypothesized economic model resulted in a reduction of observations to a usable sample size of 
418 waterfowl hunters.  Data for this subsample indicate that a typical waterfowl lease had 21.9 
members  who leased an average of 1,409 acres.  Hunters who leased paid an average of $4,195 
for the entire lease, and on average, had leased the land for over 12 years.  The average one way 
travel distance to the lease was 53.2 miles. 
 
4. Empirical Estimations 
 
The economic model specified in [1] was estimated using SAS and data from the waterfowl 
hunting survey.  Economic theory offers little guidance with respect to the choice of functional 
form for the hedonic equation (Freeman, 1979).  While earlier hedonic studies used linear 
specifications, recent investigations aimed at identifying more appropriate functional 
specifications have indicated the superiority of flexible forms (Cooper et al., 1987; Milon et al., 
1984).  Coefficients resulting from linear specifications identify the relative contribution of their 
respective attributes to the price of the product.  Linear specifications, however, imply constant 
marginal willingness-to-pay for all households consuming the good (Freeman, 1979).  This does 
not allow for the identification of the demand schedule for the attribute in question and also 
ignores the possibility that demand for the attribute may be a function of its level as well as the 
level of other attributes.  In the case of non-linear specifications, the first derivative of the 
hedonic price function with respect to the specified attribute yields the implicit marginal price of 
the attribute (McMillan et al., 1980). 
 
As economic theory provides no clear guidance regarding the choice of functional form to be 
used in hedonic regressions, it can be argued that the transformation which best fits the data is 
preferred. An empirical search for alternative functional forms indicated that the semi-log 
functional form yielded the best fit for this specification.  Results of the empirical estimation of 
the hedonic price function with only the dependent variable, PRICE, logged are presented in 
Table 1.  The R-square value presented is comparable to those of similar cross-sectional studies 
(Messonnier and Luzar, 1990; Livengood, 1983; Pope and Stoll, 1985).   
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 Table 1 
 Price Equation Estimates:  Hedonic Price Model of Louisiana Waterfowl  
 Hunting Leases, 1990-91 Waterfowl Hunting Dataa 
 
Variable  Coefficient Variable Mean 
 
PRICE (per member) 
 
 - 
  
 
 451.296 
ACPERMEM  0.00051 
 (2.302) 
 138.320 
DISTANCE  0.00501 
 (2.159) 
 53.253 
IMPROVE  -0.3415 
 (-0.727) 
 0.050 
LANDPREP  0.39707 
 (0.695) 
 0.046 
MARSH  2.27021 
 (1.930) 
 0.004 
NONCON  0.79315 
 (2.289) 
 0.064 
LEASEYR  0.01843 
 (1.480) 
 12.947 
INTERCEPT  4.64781 
 (16.846) 
 - 
n 
R2 
 
 418 
 0.38 
 
 
a.t-values in parentheses.  Critical t-statistics at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are 2.326, 
1.645, and 1.282, respectively. 
At the five percent level of confidence, acres per member, distance, nonconsumptive uses of the 
lease, and habitat were found to be significant contributors to the value of a Louisiana waterfowl 
hunting lease.  The number of years leased was significant at the ten percent confidence level. 
 
Owner provided services, including provision of blinds, land preparation, and access 
improvements were not found to significantly contribute to the value of a Louisiana waterfowl 
hunting lease, and in the case of access improvements had an inverse relationship with lease 
price.  These results tend to support the hypothesis that waterfowl hunters prefer leases offering 
adequate acreage per member (lower congestion) in a particular habitat that they can lease over a 
period of years.  In this environment, waterfowl hunters may be substituting their own inputs 
into the production of hunting access rather than pay in the market for owner provided services. 
 
The identified hedonic price function was next differentiated with respect to ACPERMEM, 
DISTANCE, and LEASEYR for each household.  These derivatives, when evaluated at each 
household's level of the attributes, provide an estimation of the household's marginal implicit 
willingness-to-pay for these attributes.  Differentiation of the function estimated by the hedonic 
regression with respect to the selected attributes results in the vectors of individual, marginal 
implicit prices given by: 
 
 
[2] PAPMi = 0.00051e
4.6478 + 0.7931NONCON
i
 + 0.00051ACPERMEM
1 
[3] PDISTi = 0.0050e
4.6478 + 0.7931NONCON
i
 + 0.0050DISTANCE
1    
[4] PYEARSi = 0.0184e
4.6478 + 0.7931NONCON
i
 + 0.0184LEASEYR
1    
 
 
 
The resulting vectors of prices were in turn regressed on significant attributes, ACPERMEM, 
DISTANCE, and LEASEYR and three dummy variables indicating three income levels.  It was 
assumed in this analysis that due to the short-run, cross-sectional nature of the data, the supply 
of leasable hunting land was fixed thereby eliminating identification problems. The implicit 
specification for estimation of these inverse demand functions is given as: 
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[5]  PAPM = f(ACPERMEM, HIGHINC, MEDINC, LOWINC, ε)  
 
[6]  PDIST = f(DISTANCE, HIGHINC, MEDINC, LOWINC, ε)  
 
[7]  PYEARS = f(LEASEYR, HIGHINC, MEDINC, LOWINC, ε)  
 
 
Variables, with a priori hypothesized signs in parentheses, were defined as: 
 
 PAPM   = Marginal implicit price of ACPERMEM 
 ACPERMEM (+) = Acres of lease per club member 
 PDIST  = Marginal implicit price of DISTANCE 
 
 DISTANCE (+) = Distance of lease from respondent's home (in miles) 
 
 PYEARS  = Marginal implicit price of LEASEYR 
 
 LEASEYR (+) = Years the land has been leased for waterfowl hunting 
 
 HIGHINC (+) = Dummy for high income level; 1 if at least 
     $45,000 per year, 0 otherwise 
 
 MEDINC (+) = Dummy for medium income level; 1 if $25,000 
     to $44,999 per year, 0 otherwise 
 
 LOWINC (-)  = Dummy for low income level; 1 if $24,999 or 
     less per year, 0 otherwise 
 
The binary variables representing the three income levels were included as hypothesized 
demand shifters.  Using MEDINC as the base income level, higher income levels would be 
expected to shift demand outward, while lower income levels were expected to shift demand 
inward.  Results of these estimations are presented in Table 2.  The attributes ACPERMEM, 
LEASEYR, and DISTANCE are significant at the five percent confidence level, as well as 
dummy variables representing low income and medium income (intercept terms).  Taking the 
anti-log of these functions yields the following relationships: 
 
  [8] PAPM = e0.06156 ACPERMEM0.00008 
  [9] PDIST = e0.66050 DISTANCE0.00426   
 [10] PYEARS = e1.86184 LEASEYR0.10249  
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Table 2 
 Demand Equation Estimates:  Hedonic Price Model of Louisiana Waterfowl 
 Hunting Leases: 1990-91 Waterfowl Hunting Dataa 
 
Variable  Coefficientb Variable 
 Meanb 
Coefficientc Variable 
Meanc 
Coefficientd Variable 
 Meand 
 
ACPERMEN 
 
 0.000081 
 (10.109) 
 
138.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEASEYR    0.102491 
 (4.170) 
12.94   
LDIST      0.004270 
 (5.256) 
53.25 
HIGHINC  0.001227 
 (0.114) 
0.454  0.196576 
 (0.424) 
0.454  0.024041 
 (0.187) 
0.454 
LOWINC  0.282203 
 (7.004) 
0.156  2.213576 
 (1.603) 
0.156  0.626810 
 (1.657) 
0.156 
INTERCEPT  0.061570 
 (6.388) 
0.310  1.861847 
 (4.170) 
0.310  0.660501 
 (5.459) 
0.310 
n 
R2 
 
 418 
 0.889 
  418 
 0.505 
  418 
 0.387 
 
 
 
a.T-values in parentheses  
b.Hedonic price function differentiated with respect to ACPERMEM 
c.Hedonic price function differentiated with respect to LEASEYR 
d.Hedonic price function differentiated with respect to DISTANCE 
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The empirical relationships defined by these implicit prices and income levels suggest that these 
attributes of waterfowl hunting leases are less responsive to income changes than some other 
forms of hunting recreation, including deer hunting and small game hunting (Livengood, 1983; 
Messonnier and Luzar, 1990).  Waterfowl hunting has evolved as a specialized outdoor 
recreation activity characterized by participants with relatively high income levels (Wesley, 
1987).  Increased specialization in outdoor recreation and the relatively high income levels of 
waterfowl hunters may influence the demand for lease attributes, including owner provided 
services.    
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The recreation trend of increased specialization coupled with conditions of restrictive access due 
to resource availability (including regulatory restrictions and habitat availability) have reduced 
the number of waterfowl hunters nationally.  Waterfowl hunters who have remained with the 
sport often resort to fee based access to habitat at a relatively high cost per member.  
Landowners recognizing the alternative income opportunities associated with leasing land for 
fee based waterfowl hunting access typically have little information upon which to base 
decisions regarding the bundle of goods to provide hunters.  
 
This hedonic analysis of owner-provided services for waterfowl leasing suggests that waterfowl 
hunters will pay to reduce congestion (increase acres per member) and for prime habitat (coastal 
marsh) and are willing to pay the increased travel costs associated with these lease attributes.  
This analysis also suggests that Louisiana waterfowl hunters are not willing to pay for owner-
provided improvements such as duck blinds or boat launches but would rather substitute their 
own inputs over an extended lease period.  Landowners as a result may avoid costly 
improvements to their land and instead offer longer term leases.  
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